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Literature Review 
 In recent years, state legislatures across the country have begun to pass legislation 
preventing citizens from voting without first presenting appropriate forms of identification. This 
issue has polarized the American political community. Many liberal politicians such as the 
Democratic President Barack Obama have publicly condemned the new voter identification laws, 
while more conservative politicians, such as Newt Gingrich, have supported them (Lavender). 
Key to the controversy is the contentions of liberal leaders that the Republican leaders who 
support voter identification laws do so out of the intent of effectively disenfranchising 
demographic groups that would vote for Democratic candidates, such as people of color (Reilly). 
Evaluating the evidence as to the racial motivations behind these pieces of legislation requires a 
look at the literature surrounding the role of race in partisan American politics as well as how 
voter identification laws impact voter turnout.  
Race and Current Partisan Issues 
 The Republican Party continues to struggle in attracting people of color, something that 
makes them an obstacle to GOP electoral success. Many academics, such as Seth C. McKee look 
to the opposition of Republican Presidential candidates such as Barry Goldwater towards civil 
rights legislation as a key moment that turned African-Americans away from the Republican 
Party, a trend that continues to the present day (7). The large degree of African-American 
support has led to significant gains for the Democratic Party. For example, Steven Taylor 
concludes that black support for Barack Obama was nearly unanimous in his successful 2008 
Presidential campaign (6). Scholars have also come to the conclusion that the Republican Party 
has failed to attract black voters even when they agree with many Republican policies. 
Christopher G. Ellison and Eric. L. McDaniels both come to the conclusion that even amongst 
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evangelicals, who tend to favor social views held by Republican candidates the Republican Party 
still attracts mainly whites (10). Quentin Kidd, Herman Diggs, Mehreen Farooq, and Megan 
Murray come to the same conclusion while looking at 2004 election data, finding that even 
though the social conservatism of some African-Americans on issues can affect voting behavior, 
the black allegiance to the Democratic Party still dominates black voter choice (174). When 
simply looking at legislative districts, academics have found that African-Americans tend to 
flock towards the Democratic Party. For example, Richard Forgette, Andrew Garner, and John 
Winkle come to the conclusion that few of the uncontested Republican districts of the American 
South are held by black representatives (306). Other political scientists have argued that 
Republican strategies that have worked to divide the electorate along racial lines have actually 
backfired on the Republican Party, partially explaining the continued failure of Republican 
candidates to win over people of color. Shaun Bowler, Stephen P. Nicholson, and Gary M. 
Segura find that the ballot measures sponsored by the Republican party in the 1990’s to restrict 
the rights of undocumented immigrants, end affirmative action, and halt bilingual education 
programs actually reversed trends of Latinos moving towards the Republican Party (149). 
Overall, much of the literature concerning party loyalties among minority voters shows that 
people of color tend to vote Democratic, while white people tend to vote Republican. 
Party Loyalty and Other Demographics 
 Besides people of color, scholars have noted that the poor and the young tend to have 
strong loyalties for the Democratic Party. For example, Gallup’s Jeffrey Jones has found that 
since 2006, young people have actually become more loyal to the Democratic Party than ever. 
Pew Research Center polling presents similar findings, noting an increase in the number of 
young Democratic supporters between the 2004 and 2008 elections. In addition, the Washington 
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Post reported that people ages 18 to 29 were largely supportive of President Barack Obama in his 
re-election campaign. In addition, a majority of voters without a high school degree and a 
majority of voters with lower incomes generally voted for President Obama in 2012 (“Exit 
Polls”).  
Background 
 State governments across the United States, but especially in the South, have a long 
history of using supposedly race-neutral measures to take the right to vote away from people of 
color. Because the passage of the 15th Amendment of the United States Constitution forbade 
states from preventing blacks from voting, Southern legislatures had to find more indirect ways 
of disenfranchising African-Americans (Kousser). For instance, Southern legislatures made use 
of “poll taxes”, large fees that prevented blacks from voting because they represented some of 
the poorest elements of society (University of Texas). In addition, many states made use of 
“grandfather clauses” in which only citizens whose ancestors had voted prior to 1866 would be 
allowed to vote (Greenblatt). These measures stopped many African-Americans from voting 
because African-Americans did not have the right to vote until after the Civil War. Finally, many 
states in the American South made use of literacy tests in order to disenfranchise African-
Americans (Kousser). Forcing blacks to prove literacy prevented many from voting because of 
the high rates of illiteracy within the black community at the time. The literacy tests also 
prevented African-Americans from voting because of the large degrees of discretion allotted to 
registrars in deciding which individuals met the standards of literacy. Therefore, American state 
governments have a long history of using legislative measures to take the right to vote away from 
African-Americans  
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 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 helped to prevent these disenfranchisement efforts after 
the Civil Rights Movement took place and has remained at the center of the debate about the 
legality of the new wave of voter identification laws. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 in order to allow blacks access to the ballot by providing a federal review process for all 
changes to the election procedures of state governments (Yale Law School). Since that time, 
Congress has amended the law in order to provide more protections for citizens who do not 
speak English. Congress renewed the law in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006 (The Leadership 
Conference of Civil and Human Rights). However, in 2013, the Supreme Court found the 
provision of the Voting Rights Act allowing for federal oversight of the election processes of 
Southern states to be unconstitutional in the case of Shelby v. Holder. This decision proved 
highly controversial, as many liberal political leaders claimed that it would open the door for 
Southern states legislatures to craft discriminatory voting policies and create more voter 
identification laws. 
Reports on Voter Identification Laws and Impact on Turnout 
 A large number of studies have come to the conclusion that voter identification laws have 
the effect of disenfranchising many Americans, much like earlier efforts by Southern authorities 
did. One earlier study that came to such a conclusion occurred in 2007 (Alvarez, Baley, and Katz 
19). Here, researchers found that the strictest voter identification laws would depress turnout for 
the poor and the less educated, although they could not affirm any official specific impact on 
racial groups. Another study from the early part of the recent voter identification law wave, 
conducted by M.V. Hood and C.S. Bullock concludes that the Georgia voter identification law 
substantially lowered voter turnout for citizens lacking photo identification (408). In addition, the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus published a report warning that continued efforts to pass voter 
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identification laws at the state level would decrease Latino turnout and further their 
representation gap in Congress (8). Matt A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nuno, and Gabriel R. Sanchez 
come to an even more widespread conclusion about the disenfranchising effects of photo 
identification laws. They argue that photo identification laws, such as the one they study in 
Indiana, have the effect of reducing the number of young people, the elderly, people of color, and 
less educated people at the polls during an election (113). Finally, one oft-cited study, published 
by the Brennan Center’s Keesha Gaskins and Sundeep Iyer came to a similar conclusion about 
the negative impacts of voter identification laws on people of color, pointing out that even if 
voter identification is made free of charge, many people of color do not have the resources to 
travel to a government office to obtain one (9). 
On the other hand, many other scholars have come to the conclusion that voter 
identification laws do not disenfranchise many voters at all and that they provide substantial 
benefits to the American electoral system. In one early study by Jason Mycoff, David Wilson, 
and Michael Wagner, the scholars determined that based on voter behavior data from 2000, 
2002, and 2004 there is no effect from voter identification laws on voter turnout (17). Other 
studies have defended voter identification laws for the trust that they inspire in the American 
electorate. For example, Robert A. Pastor, Robert Santos, Allison Prevost, and Vassia Stoilov 
use survey data to argue that most Americans would trust the results of elections more if voters 
were forced to bring a form of identification to the polls (480). Hans A. von Spakovsky and Peter 
McGinley defend voter identification laws by pointing out the flaws in the study presented by the 
Brennan Center, arguing that it relies on inadequate methodology and ignores key evidence 
about how available voter identification is for people of color throughout the states in which 
these laws have been passed. 
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Race and the Motivations Behind Voter Identification Laws 
Several studies have drawn parallels with the tactics that the Republican Party has made 
use of in order to stop voter fraud in past decades, and the tactics employed by the Republican 
party to prevent fraud in the years since the 2000 Presidential Election. One report by Teresa 
James for ProjectVote traces Republican efforts to “cage” votes back to the Jim Crow era (4). 
She argues that the Republican Party would frequently send out mailings to areas with high 
numbers of racial minorities and then attempt to purge voters whose address resulted in the 
mailings bouncing back (5). Challenges to these voters would often come on the eve of an 
election. James concludes that stricter guidelines for voter fraud challenges are necessary to 
preserve the fairness of the electoral process and prevent similar attempts at disenfranchising 
groups in the present day (34). 
Another report that has analyzed past efforts by the Republican Party to root out voter 
fraud comes from Chandler Davidson, Tanya Dunlap, Gale Kenny and Benjamin Wise. Their 
research focuses on the Republican Party’s attempt to clear black and Hispanic voters from the 
ballot starting in 1958 (17). Republican officials mailed literature out to thousands of residencies 
primarily populated with blacks and Latinos in order to affirm that all registered Democrats 
actually lived at the addresses they were listed under. In addition, Republican officials would 
also challenge blacks and Latinos in line to vote by asking them to read sections from the 
Constitution (18). If the person could not or would not complete the reading, the officials would 
ask the citizen to leave the voting line. The authors note that many of these “vote caging” efforts 
are unsuccessful at catching actual fraud, but that the Republican Party has continued to employ 
this tactic since 1958 (31). 
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Several scholars have attempted to examine what factors lead certain states to pass voter 
identification laws in the first place. Keith G. Bentele and Erin E. O’Brien studied the 
relationship between political control of state legislatures, increasing closeness of state elections, 
and demographic changes on the likelihood of a state passing a voter identification law (1097). 
The study approached the question using GMM analysis, a cross-sectional approach that allowed 
them to weigh different factors and isolate which ones made the biggest impact over time. The 
researchers concluded that the recent wave of voter identification laws is designed to 
“demobilize” key segments of the population. In addition, they note that politicians tend to weigh 
the costs and benefits to see if passing a voter identification law will ultimately increase 
prospects for electoral victory. 
 Another study that has approached this question was completed by William D. Hicks, 
Seth C. McKee, Mitchell D. Sellers, and Daniel A. Smith. The study looked at some of the same 
factors as the aforementioned study. This study found evidence linking the number of non-white 
registered voters in a state to the number of restrictive voter identification bills introduced in the 
state (8). The study also found that the number of neighboring states that have adopted restrictive 
voter identification laws and the number of cases of alleged voter fraud impact the number of 
voter identification laws within a state (9). The study’s strongest finding came when the scholars 
analyzed what factors impact whether a state actually adopts a voter identification law. They find 
that the number of Republican representatives in a state legislature positively affects whether a 
state passes a voter identification law in electorally competitive states (10). They also find that 
battle-ground states are more likely to enact voter identification laws when state voter turnout 
becomes higher (11).  
D’Alessio 11 
 
Other researchers attack the question using survey data. Mathew Mendez and Christian 
Grose circulated emails from fake individuals asking if a driver’s license is required for voting. 
The different emails sent out across 28 different legislative chambers appeared to be from 
Latino, English speaking and Spanish speaking individuals. Ultimately, if the legislator had 
supported voter identification laws, the emails made to appear to be from Latino citizens were 
significantly less likely to receive responses to their inquiry from the legislator (27). The 
researchers alleged that this behavior hints at the possibility of legislators who support voter 
identification laws acting in order to prevent Latinos from voting. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
 The purpose of this study then, is to fill in the gaps left by these studies. My main 
question is why certain states pass stricter voter identification laws, while other states are content 
to pass the less stringent ones. The previous studies that have attacked this issue have included 
more broad statistical analysis. While they have successfully determined the main trends 
concerning the causes of the passage of voter identification, a case study will determine the more 
specific process over time of how race and demographics impact the passage of voter 
identification laws. In addition, the studies focus more on which states pass voter identification 
laws in general, whereas I am interested in discovering what also determines the presence of 
stringent laws. These trends and gaps in the literature that I looked at led me towards my main 
hypothesis. The Republican Party has struggled to rally people of color and young people to its 
side. Therefore, large percentages of people of color within a state’s population would present a 
problem for Republicans. Given this notion; my main hypothesis reads: 
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H: If a state has increasing minority and youth voter populations, then a state will see the 
introduction of voter identification laws. 
My sub-hypotheses read as follows; 
Ha: If a state shows an increase in its racial minority voting population and has Republicans in 
control of the state legislature, then it will see more passages of stringent voter identification 
laws. 
Hb: If a state has an increased young people voting and a majority Republican control of the 
state legislature, then it will see the passage of stringent voter identification laws.  
I look at some of the same variables as other social scientists such as Keith G. Bentele 
and Erin E. O’Brien have looked at (e.g., the growth of the non-white population of a state and 
its impact on the likelihood of the passage of a voter identification law in that given state). I 
expand on these variables from registered non-white voters to the percentage of actual votes cast 
by people of color in elections. In addition, my variables include young people, because young 
people tend to vote for Democrats. All my demographic data comes from the Census Bureau’s 
“Hot Reports” compiled through surveys in even numbered years (U.S. Census Bureau). I will 
also make use of the Census Bureau’s Voting Hot Report’s percentages of voting for different 
populations within each state. I examine percentages of voting for populations of color as well as 
people ages 18-29 who have voted in elections. I choose to look at the rate of voting for these 
states because I want to look specifically at voter identification laws as reactions to demographic 
changes that pose political challenges, not as a result of general cultural anxieties. For one 
measure, I examine the percentage of voting for these populations in the most recent mid-term 
election to the year of passage of the voter identification law. I choose to only look at the 
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percentage of turnout during mid-term elections because generally, voting percentages increase 
during presidential election years, so it would appear as if the voting percentages jumped 
drastically if I compared the voting rate of a demographic during a mid-term year to a 
Presidential year (Desilver). In addition, I compared the voting rate of these populations to 
voting rate of the same population in the same state in the most recent midterm election 
preceding it, noting the percentage of change. I did this in order to determine if the rate of voting 
in the year closest to the passage of the law was part of a trend in increasing or decreasing rates 
of voting. The Voting Hot Reports began in 2006, meaning that I cannot make use of data for 
any state that had passed a voter identification law prior to that year. In addition, all my data 
about the dates and stringency of the passage of voter identification laws comes from the 
National Conference of State Legislatures database. The database breaks down the stringency of 
the state laws into strict photo identification laws, strict non-photo identification laws, non-strict 
photo identification laws, and non-strict non-photo identification laws. A law is considered strict 
under these criteria if a person unable to produce a proper identification has no opportunity to 
cast a countable ballot on the day of the election I also organized a list of states that had laws 
easing access to the polls, as compiled by the Brennan Center at the New York University 
School of Law. I chose to look at these states in order to try and find the demographic and 
political changes that may have led state politicians to want more people voting, as opposed to 
the states in which Republicans seemed unconcerned with the potential of voter identification 
laws to deter voting. The passage of these measures to ensure greater access to the polls occurred 
during the years 2013-2014.  As I did with the states’ voter identification laws passed, I compiled 
percentages of the voting rates of blacks, Hispanics, and young people in directly preceding mid-
term elections and then compared those rates to those of prior midterms. 
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Initial Observations 
The justification for my research design requires a brief overview of the states that have 
cast a voter identification law and any demographic changes that preceded them.  In the 
following table I provide an overview of all the states in the U.S. that have passed voter 
identification laws, how stringent those laws are, and the state of racial demographics shortly 
before passage. The column entitled voter identification law looks at the laws stringency as 
defined by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The percentage of voting at passage of 
the bill refers to the rate of overall voting for all citizens in the most recent midterm before the 
passage of the voter identification law. In addition, the column concerning the rate of change for 
this value concerns the amount of change in the overall voting rate between the most recent 
midterm before a voter identification law passage and the most recent midterm preceding that 
midterm. The percentage of African-Americans, Hispanics, and young people voting at the time 
of the passage of the law refers to the voting rate of this demographic at the most recent mid-
term election before the passage of the law. In addition, the columns labeled “percentage 
change” refers to the amount of change in the demographic’s voter turnout from the mid-term 
prior to the mid-term directly preceding the year of the passage of a voting law change. The 
column labeled “Party in Control” refers to which political party controlled all houses of the 
legislature.  
 
Figure 1 
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State Voter 
identifica
tion law 
% of 
overa
ll 
votin
g at 
passa
ge 
% 
chan
ge in 
the 
over
all 
votin
g 
%of 
African
-
Americ
ans 
voting 
in state 
election
s at 
passage 
% 
change 
in 
African
-
Americ
ans 
voting 
in state 
election
s 
% of 
Hispa
nic 
voters 
voting 
in 
state 
electio
ns at 
passag
e 
% 
change 
of 
Hispani
c voters 
voting 
in state 
electio
ns at 
passage 
% of 
people 
18-29 
who 
voted 
at 
passag
e 
% of 
people 
18-29 
who 
voted 
in 
state 
electio
ns at 
passag
e 
Party in 
control 
Alabama Non-
strict 
44.1 -5.6 46 -2 22 -36 23 -3 Republi
can 
Alaska Non-
strict 
55.1 -0.2 32 -10 34 -16% 23 -6 Divided 
Arkansas Non-
strict 
40.7 -4.7 32 -2 21 -1 18 -3 Republi
can 
Colorado Non-
strict 
52.6 -1.7 47 22 32 -8 30 -1 Divided 
Connecti
cut 
Non-
strict 
49.3 -0.6 45 9 28 2 22 0 Democr
atic 
Delaware Non-
strict  
51 -5.4 50 9 32 15 29 4 Democr
atic 
Florida Non-
strict  
43.9 -0.3 42 3 41 10 24 6 Republi
can 
Georgia Strict 43.6 -0.3 41 13.4 21 14 29 -20 Republi
can 
Idaho Non-
strict 
47.5 -3.6 52 -52 15 -2 23 -7 Republi
can 
Kansas Strict 47.2 0.7 32 5 30 5 20 0 Republi
can 
Mississip
pi 
Strict 47.1 4.3 49 -1 37 -30 29 4 Republi
can 
Montana Strict 51.9 -7.7 45 -10 45 27 26 -13 Republi
can 
New 
Hampshi
re 
Non-
strict 
46.9 -1.5 36 0 28 -13 22 3 Republi
can 
North 
Carolina 
Strict 45.5 5.1 41 9 44 -31 24 3 Republi
can 
North 
Dakota 
Strict 55.7 1.3 15 -14 28 -2 35 5 Republi
can 
Ohio Strict 45.2 -7.8 43 -2 29 -4 21 -10 Republi
can 
Oklahom
a 
Non-
strict 
40.4 5.8 37 12 16 -9 19 -6 Republi
can 
Pennsylv
ania 
Non-
strict 
43.9 -8.2 46 11 4 4 23 -2 Republi
can 
Rhode 
Island 
Non-
strict 
46.7 -
12.1 
34 -22 19 -24 22 -13 Democr
atic 
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South 
Carolina 
Non-
strict 
50.9 5.7 54 3 9 -10 35 11 Republi
can 
South 
Dakota 
Non-
strict 
54.8 -8.2 36 -64 35 -7 33 -6 Republi
can 
Tennesse
e 
Strict 37.7 -7.7 36 3 26 10 16 -7 Republi
can 
Texas Strict 36.4 -2 39 2 23 -2 16 -1 Republi
can 
Utah Non-
strict 
36.7 -7.1 22 8 19 11 17 0 Republi
can 
Virginia Strict 40.7 6.7 36 0 19 -13 21 -11 Republi
can 
Wisconsi
n 
Strict 54.3 -3.5 46 2 39 9 29 -11 Republi
can 
 
In this next table, I look at the same measures of demographics, but looked at years where state 
legislatures, according to the Brennan Center, had expanded voter access through use of 
legislation. 
Figure 2 
State Expansio
n 
% of 
overall 
voter 
turnout at 
passage 
% change 
in overall 
voter 
turnout 
%of 
African-
America
ns 
voting in 
state 
elections 
at 
passage 
% 
change 
in 
African-
America
ns 
voting in 
state 
elections 
% of 
Hispani
c 
voters 
voting 
in state 
electio
ns at 
passage 
% 
increas
e in 
Hispani
c 
voters 
in state 
electio
ns at 
passage 
% of 
people 
18-29 
who 
voted 
in state 
electio
ns at 
passage 
% 
change 
in 
people 
18-29 
who 
voted 
in state 
electio
ns at 
passage 
Party in 
Control 
Colorado Election 
Day 
registratio
n, 
expanded 
access for 
voters 
who do 
not speak 
English 
52.6 -1.7 47 22 32 -8 30 -1 Democra
tic Party 
Deleware Restored 
voting 
rights to 
felons 
51 -5.4 50 9 32 15 29 4 Democra
tic Party 
Hawaii Same-day 
registratio
n 
43.1 -0.3 37 15 36 -9 26 6 Democra
tic Party 
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Illinois Same-day 
voting 
registratio
n, early 
voting 
expansion
, online 
voting 
45.5 -1.8 32 -16 52 21 24 1 Democra
tic Party 
Louisiana 16 and 17 
year old 
pre-
registratio
n 
50 10 49 -13 24 -29 26 8 Republic
an Party 
Maryland Increased 
early 
voting, 
same day 
registratio
n 
46.8 -9.6 47 -4 33 -16 24 -9 Democra
tic Party 
Massachus
etts 
Early 
voting, 
online 
voting, 
pre-
registratio
n for 16 
and 17 
year olds 
52.2 -2.2 39 -6 14 -20 26 -8 Democra
tic Party 
Minnesota Online 
Registrati
on 
54.9 -10.5 44 -7 33 -9 35 -8 Democra
tic Party 
Mississippi Expansio
n of 
emergenc
y 
absentee 
ballot 
47.1 5.3 49 1 37 37 29 4 Republic
an Party 
Nebraska Automati
c 
registratio
n through 
moter 
vehicle 
associatio
n, online 
registratio
n 
41.2 -10 17 -4 22 -9 14 -8 Republic
an Party 
New 
Mexico 
Automati
c 
registratio
42.5 -11.8 0 -29 35 -17 20 -5 Democra
tic Party 
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n through 
moter 
vehicle 
associatio
n 
Oklahoma Loosened 
voter id 
law and 
increased 
access to 
absentee 
ballots on 
tribal 
lands 
40.4 5.8 37 12 16 -9 19 -6 Republic
an Party 
Utah Election 
day 
registratio
n, 
expanded 
registratio
n times, 
online 
alteration 
of 
registratio
n 
informati
on 
38.6 0.9 22 8 19 -11 17 0 Republic
an Party 
Virginia Online 
Registrati
on 
40.7 6.7 36 0 19 -13 21 -11 Republic
an Party 
West 
Virginia 
Online 
Registrati
on 
41 4.1 38 12 38 0 22 6 Democra
tic Party 
 
 
 
Initial analysis of these tables reveals several interesting trends. First, that there is a 
substantial amount of overlap between states that passed restrictive voter identification laws, and 
those that actually expanded voter access. Several of these states, such as Oklahoma, passed 
these voter expansion laws under Republican controlled state legislatures. This would seem to 
conflict with the contention made by liberals that Republicans are interested in suppressing 
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minority and young voting through voter identification laws. In addition, not all states that have 
passed voter identification laws saw increases in minority and young voting rates in the years 
leading up to the passages of these laws. For instance, Arkansas saw decreases in the voting rates 
of blacks, Hispanics and people ages 18-29 leading up to the passage of the bill. The evidence 
presented by states such as these would undermine the narrative advanced by liberals that 
legislatures are passing these laws in response to spikes in voting rates from these demographic 
groups. Finally, the states with higher voting rates of blacks, Hispanics, and young people tend to 
correlate with the passage of voter identification laws are swing states with Republican state 
legislatures. This is interesting, as it could indicate that Republican leaders are passing voter 
identification laws in order to keep down the voting rates for demographics that normally vote 
Democratic, and in turn secure their state for Republican Presidential prospects. Therefore it 
provides strong support for the liberal narrative that state Republicans pass voter identification 
laws in order to win elections by demobilizing certain members of the electorate in places where 
they matter most for Republican Presidential prospects. 
Research Design 
My research design will look at the introduction and passage of voter identification laws 
from the years 2000 to the present in state governments. My analysis will examine newspaper 
articles from local papers, as well as any available testimonies and debates about the introduction 
and passage of this bill. In particular, I will look at coverage that focuses on the racial 
implications of voter identification bills as well as the exact text of the bills themselves. My 
independent variable for these cases will be changes in the rate of voting for people of color and 
between the ages of 18-29 in the state. My dependent variables will be the introduction and or 
passage of stringent photo or non-photo voter identification laws across the state. Through my 
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analysis of media coverage surrounding the event, I will see if the increases in these 
demographics of a state will impact whether a state introduction and passage of voter 
identification laws. In order to see this process unfolding, I hope to look at the partisan 
composition of the state legislature and the ways that elected officials supported the bill publicly 
and privately. I hope to look at the groups that have lobbied on behalf of the bill, any other bills 
overhauling the voting system that passed in the same “package” and any other already existing 
voting legislation that could have affected the voting rights of citizens. Finally, I will look at the 
general language of the bill itself, and what specific provisions within it that could hint at any 
possible intentions on the part of the Republicans who supported it to hurt the voting prospects of 
certain demographics. This kind of case study analysis will allow me to see how the passage of 
the law played out in each state in a more in-depth manner that previous statistical analysis has 
not allowed for. 
I present five case studies: one each from a state in which a strict voter identification laws 
was passed, a state in which a more lenient law was passed, a state in which neither a voter 
identification law nor a law expanding voter access was passed, and a state in which a voter 
expansion bill was passed. This will allow me to weigh the influence of my independent 
variables on five significantly different outcomes. 
My first case will look at the passage of North Carolina’s voter identification bill. North 
Carolina’s voter identification law is strict, indeed one of the strictest voter identification laws in 
the country. In addition, North Carolina is a swing state, and one with changing demographics 
that allowed it to flip from being primarily Republican controlled in Presidential contests to 
going for Obama in 2008. This means that if state Republicans are truly attempting to block 
minority and young turnout as liberals have contended, they will certainly have the impetus to do 
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so. North Carolina is important to national Republican election prospects because of its status as 
a swing state.  
My next case will be Florida. Florida is traditionally an important state for national party 
prospects, because of its high number of Electoral College votes and the close margin which 
have decided elections in Presidential elections. In addition, the state is a good choice for my 
study because the voting rate for blacks, Hispanics, and young people shot up in the years 
preceding the passage of its voter identification law. It currently has a non-strict voter 
identification law. 
 For my third case, I will look at Wyoming, a state which has neither expanded voter 
access nor passed a voter identification law. The state’s legislature has been traditionally 
controlled by Republicans, so it will be interesting to determine what has led the state not to pass 
a voter identification law while so many other Republican states have.  
Next, I will examine Oklahoma. Oklahoma currently has a voter identification law in 
effect, but it has loosened that law and also passed an expansion of access to absentee ballots on 
tribal lands. All this has happened with a Republican state legislature in office in state where 
politics are usually characterized by lopsided Republican victories in Presidential elections. This 
will be an interesting case to test the impact of party control on the passage of laws that expand 
voter access. 
 Finally, I will look at the state of California, a demographically diverse state where 
Democrats have enjoyed strong support since the 1990’s. An analysis of this state’s discussion 
about potentially passing a voter identification law will further illuminate my study. 
Case Study 1: North Carolina 
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The state legislature of North Carolina has been in the hands of the Democratic Party for 
much of the 2000’s, with the Republican Party only seizing control in the 2010 midterm 
elections (National Conference of State Legislatures “Voter Identification Requirements”). 
However, the Republican Party has strong roots in the state of North Carolina. Republican 
Presidential candidates had won the state from 1980 to 2008, when Barack Obama captured its 
electoral votes. Mitt Romney success in recapturing the state in his Republican Presidential 
campaign of 2012 also reflected the power of the Republican Party in the state. In 2012, the 
Republican Party gained control of the governor’s office with the election of Pat McCrory after 
Democrats controlled the position for most of the decade (Blake). The North Carolina state 
legislature is bicameral and its Senate was comprised of 17 Democrats and 33 Republicans at the 
start of 2013, while its lower chamber had 43 Democrats and 77 Republicans. In terms of recent 
demographic changes that occurred in North Carolina, the state experienced a 9 percent increase 
of its black population voting in the 2010 midterms. The state did experience a 33 percent drop 
in the voting of its Hispanic population, but the 49 percent voting rate of the Latino population in 
North Carolina is even greater than other states where voter identification laws passed, such as 
Florida. Finally, the state’s population of people ages 18-29 came out to the polls at a 3 percent 
higher rate in 2010.  This increase in minority and youth voting matched the increase in the 
overall voting rate of North Carolina, which stood at 45.4 in 2010, and grew 5.1 percent from the 
midterm prior.  
North Carolina first passed its voter identification law in 2013. The law is considered one 
of the most restrictive voter identification laws in the country, as it offers no opportunity to cast a 
countable ballot on Election Day without a valid form of identification. Non-photographic forms 
of identification are not accepted.  The bill was sponsored by Representatives Tom Murry, Harry 
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Warren, Tim Moore, and Ruth Samuelson, all Republicans. The bill attracted national attention 
because it immediately followed the Supreme Court decision that struck down key parts of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, making it easier for Southern states to alter their voting procedures 
(Martinez). Previously, courts had prevented the implementation of many voter identification 
laws because of this section of the act. In addition, the bill contained provisions which limited 
early voting hours, ended Election Day registration, and allowed for individuals from any 
precinct to challenge the voting privileges of another citizen (Fischer). The law created backlash 
from Democrats because McCrory had campaigned as a moderate candidate focused on creating 
bipartisan solutions, yet supported a piece of legislation that Democrats claimed is designed to 
hurt Democratic election prospects (Curtis).  
Many supporters of the North Carolina law did not make any direct claim of the law 
being designed in order to limit voting from key Democratic supporters. In one interview, 
Representative Murry argued that the new law constituted a “common sense” measure, because 
forms of identification are necessary for so many basic services (PBS). Interestingly, he never 
alleged that North Carolina had ever faced any kind of epidemic of voter fraud. He also defended 
the law’s racial impact with data from other states in which state legislatures implemented voter 
identification laws. He claimed that these states actually saw an increase in the proportion of the 
black and Latino population that voted in state elections. Governor Pat McCrory, who signed the 
bill into law, defended it along similar lines. While he acknowledged that reports showed little 
voter fraud, he asserted that this bill would serve as a preventative measure to stop the possibility 
of fraud (Johnson). Other Republicans presented a perception of rampant fraud in North Carolina 
elections, comparing them to the scandalous elections of past years in Chicago (The Associated 
Press). Supporters have also justified the passage of voter identification laws by looking at the 
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larger trends occurring across the states. Governor McCrory included such an argument in his 
defense of the bill by arguing that the expectation of having to present photo identification at the 
polls has become common throughout the states, as evidenced by the other photo identification 
laws that have passed in other states (Blake). Several legislators have pointed out the weakness 
of the attacks on the voter identification bill. For example, Republican Representative David 
Lewis accused the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People of hypocrisy for 
organizing a protest against the voter identification bill, yet required participants to carry a photo 
identification at all times (McHugh). The only major instance of a Republican official explaining 
racist or partisan motivation behind the law was Don Yelton, a precinct official for the GOP who 
claimed the law would “kick Democrats in the butt” by hurting “lazy blacks” and college 
students. However, Yelton never consulted any Republican Party officials before conducting this 
interview with the press (Frankel). 
One way in which race did factor into the justifications for the passage of the bill is in 
discussion of illegal immigration by outside conservative groups. For example, one provision of 
the bill allows for voters from any precinct or district to challenge the validity of a voter’s 
citizenship. Those sections of the bill empower vigilante groups. Many of these groups cite the 
threat of illegal immigration as justification for new voter identification and patrol polling places 
in order to personally catch the perpetrators of this crime. One such group that has operated in 
North Carolina is TrueTheVote, an organization that has favored a more punitive response to 
illegal immigration out of the belief that it allows non-citizens to vote (TrueTheVote.org). 
Another important way that racial motivations come into play with the North Carolina voter 
identification law is through the influence of the Voter Integrity Project of North Carolina on the 
passage of the bill. The Voter Integrity Project of North Carolina is an organization that typically 
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supports the Republican Party, and has a record of challenging the votes of Democratic voters, 
especially voters of color (Mock). The Voter Integrity Project was allowed to testify in support 
of the bill in front of the North Carolina legislature, justifying its position through claims of 
rampant voter fraud (Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2).   
Another anti-immigrant group, the American Legislative and Exchange Council, also 
influenced the passage of the bill. This is significant, because ALEC has repeatedly made stances 
against providing more rights for undocumented immigrants, and has argued for a stricter policy 
towards enforcement of the American southern border with Mexico. For example, ALEC has 
supported the passage of a resolution against “amnesty” for undocumented immigrants, an act of 
clemency that the organization claims will allow “terrorists” and “illegal gang-members” to 
become citizens (Fischer). ALEC often proposes model legislation to different state legislators 
across the country. One organization that typically opposes ALEC, known as the Center for 
Media and Democracy, has argued that the legislation passed in North Carolina has a striking 
resemblance to model legislation for voter identification laws provided by ALEC (Fischer). 
While the language in the bill does not reflect the ALEC legislation verbatim, the bill as passed 
by the North Carolina legislature does have some of the same provisions as the ALEC 
legislation. For example, both the North Carolina bill and the ALEC bill exempt citizens with 
religious objections from having to display voter identification (Fischer). The model ALEC bill 
also contains provisions that the voter identification needs to be unexpired and that if a citizen 
cannot provide the proper identification, he or she should be offered a provisional ballot to cast 
instead. Another interesting aspect of ALEC’s involvement with the passage of this bill is the 
degree of influence that ALEC has on North Carolina legislators in general.  According to 
SourceWatch, 19 legislators who signed on as cosponsors of the bill are members of ALEC or 
D’Alessio 26 
 
have publicly acknowledged that they have met with the organization. Overall, 32 current North 
Carolina legislators have ties to ALEC. According to the same source, some of the cosponsors, 
such as Representative Timothy Moffit, are actually task force members for ALEC on different 
issues. The ties between the North Carolina Republican Party and numerous civilian groups with 
agendas focused on preventing illegal immigrants, and perhaps people of color in general, show 
that the voter identification bill passed in 2013 is likely designed to dissuade people of color 
from voting. 
In addition to the supporters driving the bill, evidence from the bill language itself and 
the press coverage of the bill indicates that Republicans intended to suppress the vote of young 
Americans through the passage of this legislation. Student groups protested the fact that the bill’s 
text did not include college student identifications from private colleges as an acceptable form of 
identification for voting (Watuga Democrat). Even more frustrating for some students was the 
fact that at public colleges, a simple change of dorm rooms would force students to have to 
acquire a new voter identification to vote. Some Republicans, such as Senator Dan Soucek, met 
with student groups and supported the inclusion of more forms of student identification into the 
bill, but indicated that the party was primarily concerned with maintaining “standards” for 
acceptable identification (Watuga Democrat). Ultimately, the bill passed unchanged.  The 
Republican Party’s refusal to alter the language of this bill indicates a subtle desire to suppress 
the vote of young people served as a major motivation behind the passage of the North Carolina 
voter identification law. 
Case Study 2: Florida 
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Florida passed its voter identification law in 2011. This bill is considered less stringent 
than voter identification laws such as that of North Carolina, because it allows citizens to cast 
some kind of countable vote even if they do not have the correct form of voter identification 
(National Council of State Legislatures “Voter Identification Requirements”).The bill was signed 
into law by the Republican Governor Rick Scott. The Senate passed the bill with 25 Senators in 
support and 13 against it, while the House of Representatives passed the bill with 77 
representatives in favor of it and 38 against it. In the Senate, Republicans held an advantage of 
28 senators to 12 Democrats (National Conference of State Legislatures “Florida”). The 
Republicans had also held control of the state legislature and the governorship for the entirety of 
past decade. The bill was introduced by Republican Representative Dennis Baxely with 
Republican co-sponsors Representative W. Keith Perry and Representative Trudith K. Williams 
(“Representative Dennis Baxely”, “Representative W. Keith Perry” “Representative Trudith K. 
Williams”). The bill passed along party lines (Somanader). In the 2010 midterms, 41 percent of 
the African-American population voted, a three percent increase from the previous midterm in 
2006. Latino voters also greatly expanded their participation in Florida politics, with 42 percent 
of the population coming out, a 7 percent increase from years past. Even the percentage of young 
people voting increased. According to the Voting Hot Report, there was a six percent jump in the 
rate of young people voting from 2006 to 2010. Also according to the Report, the state of Florida 
also saw only a slight change overall in the rate of voting amongst the general population, which 
rested at 43.9 percent and represented .3 percent dip from the midterm prior. This means that the 
voting participation rate of Latinos, young people, and black people was increasing at a 
significantly greater rate than that of the population as a whole. 
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 The bill caused a large amount of public outcry during the 2011 legislative session, with 
many liberal groups such as the League of Women Voters and labor unions calling the 
Governor’s office asking him not to sign the bill (Bousquet “Rick Scott Signs”). Six Democratic 
senators contacted the Justice Department in order to have the law blocked under the Voting 
Rights Act. The Republican response to these attacks was surprisingly muted. In fact, Secretary 
of State Kurt Browning made few public comments on the bill until after its passage. Even Rick 
Scott himself came to somewhat disassociate himself with the bill. In one public appearance in 
front of influential black political figures Scott said, “The law was not my bill” (Bousquet “Don’t 
blame me”). This is interesting, because Scott had developed a reputation for toughness on other 
voting issues, such as restoring voting rights to ex-felons. Some of the attacks generated by the 
bill referred to the fact that in addition to requiring identification at the polls, the bill contained 
provisions that vastly overhauled the voting system itself. For example, the bill cut early voting 
times, invalidated many absentee ballots, and even presented fines to many third party 
organizations attempting to campaign in the two party system (Somanader). Therefore, the 
Floridian community seems to have reacted negatively enough to cause the Republicans to draw 
down some of their support for the bill. 
Republican justification for the law did reference the racially tinged issue of immigration. 
With regards to the voting provision of the bill, Rick Scott only mentioned the law’s potential to 
prevent voter fraud and to encourage confidence in the integrity of the election (Bousquet “Rick 
Scott signs bill”). However, shortly after the passage of the bill, Governor Scott contacted the 
federal government in order to acquire federal records about undocumented immigrants living in 
the United States. He stated that his administration hoped to have these individuals removed 
from voting rolls (Weinger). In defense of this action, Governor Scott made the claim that large 
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numbers of undocumented immigrants had consistently voted in elections and contaminated the 
democratic process. Governor Scott’s perspective here shows that his viewpoint on the issue of 
voter fraud is linked with his perception on the role of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States. Therefore, despite pressure from the general public, the Republican Party made no effort 
to shy away from the fact that it pushed its voter reform laws with the intent of stopping Latinos 
from voting. 
In addition to the public comments of Florida’s politicians, insiders in the Republican 
Party have noted that concerns over keeping the voting rates of the black and Latino populations 
down influenced the decision to pass the Florida voter identification law. According to one 
report by the Palm Beach Post, the Republican Party advocated for voter identification laws 
without any true belief in the existence of a voter fraud problem in the state of Florida (Kam, 
Daram and Lantigua). This information comes primarily from former Republican Governor 
Charles Crist and former party Chairman Jim Greer. They claimed that the party scheduled 
meetings about the issue of voter turnout among Latinos and blacks after surprisingly high 
turnouts for these groups in 2008. According to these sources, the party was concerned that this 
spiking turnout would ultimately harm Republican election prospects. Therefore, ample evidence 
suggests that the changing demographics and voting turnout of people of color led to Republican 
support for voter identification laws in the state of Florida. 
 The aforementioned ALEC group in Florida also had a substantial influence on the 
Republican Party at the time of the voting on the bill. According to SourceWatch, 32 Florida 
Republican Senators and Representatives had ties to ALEC when they were voting on this bill. In 
addition, some members of the legislature, such as Representative Clay Ford, actually occupy 
seats on ALEC task forces. The high number of Representatives and Senators who had ties to 
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ALEC, a group that holds the belief that undocumented immigrants vote and dilute the value of 
the American election system, shows that anti-immigrant views likely played a large role in the 
passage of this bill.  
Case Study 3: Wyoming 
 Wyoming has never passed a voter identification law. This is interesting in that its state 
government has been primarily comprised of Republican lawmakers for much of the decade. In 
fact, since the year 2000, Democrats have never held a majority in the state legislature (National 
Council of State Legislatures “State Partisan Composition”). In addition, Wyoming has been 
won by Republican Presidential candidates during every Presidential election of the decade (270 
to Win “Wyoming”). Given this history of Republican control, it seems interesting that 
Wyoming has not passed a voter identification law. In fact, in 2012, Wyoming was the only state 
besides Oregon and Vermont which did not pass a voter identification law and did not consider 
one (Drake). Both Oregon and Vermont are states in which the Democratic Party is stronger in 
the state legislature. The supposed Republican commitment to honest and fair elections would 
lead one to believe that the Republican Party would have passed a voter identification law by 
now, but this has not been the case. Another interesting fact that would actually make a voter 
identification law in Wyoming more likely is that the response from liberal groups to voter id 
law proposals was no more extreme than in states where voter identification law did pass. For 
example, while some groups, such as the League of Women Voters, condemned a proposed voter 
identification law in 2013, Republican lawmakers did not experience the thousands of calls in 
opposition to the bill that Florida Republicans received in response to their voter id bill in 2011. 
In addition, ALEC, an organization that favors these pieces of legislation and has successfully 
swayed many state legislatures into passing them, has substantial influence in Wyoming. 
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Between Wyoming’s Senate and the House of Representatives, 26 elected officials have had ties 
to ALEC at some point (SourceWatch “Wyoming”). Despite all these factors, the Wyoming 
State Senate chose to table its only proposed voter identification law in committee for “more 
work” (TheVotingNews). This fact would seem to refute claims that state chapters of the 
Republican Party are passing voter identification laws in order to prevent people of color from 
voting in elections and hurting their electoral prospects. 
 The small voting rate of Hispanic and black voters may have had an impact on 
Wyoming’s failure to seriously consider a voter identification law. For example, in 2010, the 
midterm closest to the years in which both Florida and North Carolina passed voter identification 
laws, Wyoming’s Hispanic population voted at a rate of 24 percent (Voting Hot Report 
“Wyoming”). In contrast, 41 percent of Florida’s Hispanic voters voted, whereas 44 percent of 
North Carolina’s Hispanic population voted (Voting Hot Report “Florida”). In addition, Florida’s 
black population voted at a rate of 42 percent and North Carolina’s voted at 41 percent, whereas 
the Wyoming black population voted at a rate of only 37 percent (Voting Hot Report “Florida” 
“North Carolina” “Wyoming”). However, no significant differences occurred between rates of 
voting for young people in Wyoming, North Carolina, and Florida. All of these changes occurred 
at a time of a relative slide in the overall rate of voting in Wyoming. In 2010, the voting rate of 
Wyoming was 47.2 overall, a 3.9 percent drop from the previous midterm, but a significantly 
higher rate than the minority population. 
 In addition to a low percentage of traditionally Democratic supporters in the state, 
Wyoming also has several other measures in place that could keep down the vote for these 
groups and make a voter identification law unnecessary. For example, Wyoming does not allow 
citizens to conduct voter registration drives, something that could drive down voting rates in 
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groups that usually have lower voting rates (Brennan Center “Student Voting Guide”) (Pew 
Research Hispanic Trends Project). With this kind of a law reducing the voting rate of blacks and 
Latinos, a voter identification law may not appear as necessary. In addition, Wyoming also has 
one of the strictest ex-felon voting laws in the country, so strict that only 58 Wyoming citizens 
have ever successfully petitioned the government to have their voting rights restored (Cassidy). 
This law effectively makes voting more difficult for many people of color in the state, because 
the American prison population is disproportionately made up of people of color. For instance, 
58% of the United States prison population in 2008 was made of up blacks and Latinos 
(NAACP). Another piece of legislation that removes the necessity of a voter identification law if 
the end game is preventing people of color from voting is the strict procedures that Wyoming 
requires for its citizens to gain important forms of identification. All Wyoming residents must 
provide two forms of proof of residency in the state as well as a birth certificate and a Social 
Security number in order to get a driver’s license (Findlaw). The stringency of this law is such 
that it may lessen the perception of undocumented aliens moving freely throughout the state and 
subsequently voting. In turn, it is possible that this created less fervor in the state towards 
creating a voter identification law. 
Case Study 4: Oklahoma 
 The state legislature of Oklahoma’s passage of a bill to increase access to absentee ballots 
on tribal lands is another unexpected piece of legislation given the way that partisan debate often 
breaks down on the issue of voter identification laws. Oklahoma has remained a solidly 
Republican state for most of the 2000’s. Democrats controlled the state legislature until 2002, 
only for Republicans to take control of one house from 2004 to 2008 (National Council of State 
Legislatures “Voter Identification Requirements”). After 2008, the Republicans controlled both 
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houses of the state legislature. At the time of the passage of the bill, the Republicans held an 
advantage in the Senate of 36 to 12, and an advantage of 72 to 29 in the lower house. At the time 
of the passage of the bill, Oklahoma’s governor was Republican as well (Mary Fallin for 
Governor). Oklahoma also has a long history of Republican support during presidential elections. 
During the Presidential elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012, the Republican candidate captured 
Oklahoma’s electoral votes handily (270 to Win “Oklahoma”). The bill passed both houses of 
the state legislatures unanimously, even though it was sponsored by two Democrats 
(Oklegislature.gov).  The fact that the Republican Party would let such a bill pass with such little 
resistance is significant because Native Americans are generally loyal Democrats (Becker 2). 
This is particularly true in Oklahoma. In fact, when Brad Henry, a Democrat, won the Oklahoma 
governorship in 2004, commentators credited Native American support for his victory (Azocar). 
The passage of this bill appears even stranger considering that the Native American population in 
Oklahoma has only increased in recent years. From 2010 to 2011, the Native American 
population increased from 8.6 percent of the population to 8.9 percent (Indian Country Today 
Media Network). They are the second largest minority group in the state after Latinos. Assuming 
that the aim of Republicans in this state is to disenfranchise minorities that pose electoral trouble 
for the Party, Oklahoma made a grievous error in allowing this bill to pass. Oklahoma’s 
Republicans also have many ties to the anti-immigrant and pro-voter identification law group 
ALEC. Over 35 members of Oklahoma’s Senate and House of Representatives have some kind 
of tie to the organization (Source Watch “Oklahoma ALEC Politicians”). Despite the apparent 
support for ALEC, a bill which actually makes the ballot more accessible passed with ease 
through the legislature. 
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 Other demographic factors and changes likely explain this unexpected move in 
Oklahoma. When compared with the demographics of states such as North Carolina, which has 
not expanded voter access and imposed a strict voter identification law, prominent contrasts 
emerge. In the years leading up to the passage of this voter access bill in Oklahoma, the voting 
rate of Latino citizens was much smaller than that of North Carolina. For example, according to 
the Census Bureau, approximately 44 percent of the Latino population of North Carolina voted 
in the 2010 midterm election. Although this was a steep decrease from years past, this proportion 
still trumps the meager 16 percent of Latino citizens that voted in Oklahoma. A significant 
difference also existed between the rate of African-American voting in Oklahoma and in states 
where voting identification laws passed. In the midterm of 2010, 37 percent of the black 
population of Oklahoma voted, a 12 percent increase from the midterm preceding it. This is 
noticeably less than the state of affairs in North Carolina, where 41 percent of the black 
population voted the same year. Finally, the state also saw a smaller percentage of young people 
come out to vote in 2010. For example, only 19 percent of people ages 18-29 voted, a 6 percent 
decrease from the preceding midterm. All of these changes also occurred at a time in which the 
overall percentage of voters was increasing. In 2010, 40.4 percent of Oklahoma’s overall 
population voted, a figure which represents a 5. 8 percent increase from the last midterm before 
it. That means that the voting participation of young people and minorities were falling as the 
rest of the population was increasing its participation. This fact further emphasizes the small 
political force these groups made up in Oklahoma. The vast difference in the level of political 
participation of Latinos and African-Americans in both states shows that the Republican Party in 
North Carolina was under much more of a threat because of the larger percentage of Latino, 
African-American, and young voters. This explains why Oklahoman Republicans would have 
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felt comfortable passing a bill that may increase the number of Native American voters. They 
already held a more comfortable position in the state’s politics as a result of the state’s smaller 
minority population and proportion of young voters. In addition, Oklahoma already had a voter 
identification law in place at the time of the passage of this bill (National Conference of State 
Legislatures “Oklahoma”). If we assume once more that the intention behind voter identification 
laws is to disadvantage voters of color, then this task had already been accomplished in 
Oklahoma. Finally, Republicans may have seen Native Americans as a group worth courting. In 
some western states, Republican candidates have found success in districts with high numbers of 
Native Americans citizens, such as when Native American G. Bruce Meyers gained election to 
the Montana legislature (Dennison). Many Republican think tanks have discussed the apparent 
paradox of traditional Native American loyalty to the Democratic Party and the staunchly 
conservative views that many Native Americans hold, such as devotion to tradition. For example, 
the American Enterprise Institute writes that “with a little effort and the right arguments”, a 
Republican Presidential candidate could capture the Native American vote (Dhume). The 
growing importance of the Native American support for Republicans in Oklahoma specifically 
can be seen in the fact that Oklahoma currently has more Republican Native Americans in the 
state legislature than there are Democrats (Native American Netroots). Another example of this 
is the Cherokee Nation’s decision to donate funds to support Republican candidates such as 
Markwayne Mullin in the 2012 election (Trahant). Given this context, it makes sense that this 
small effort to increase participation in the Native American population represents an effort to 
win over the Native American vote to the Republican Party. 
Case Study 5: California 
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 To date, California has not passed any voter identification law, something that makes 
sense given the consistent Democratic majority and the large amount of racial minorities in the 
state. Democrats have traditionally held strong sway over the state legislature. For instance, 
Democrats have controlled both houses of the legislature since at least as far back as 1978 
(National Council of State Legislatures “State Partisan Composition”). In terms of nationwide 
elections, California’s population has also remained steadfastly loyal to the Democratic Party. 
For instance, Democratic Presidential candidates have handily earned California’s electoral votes 
in all of the elections of the 2000’s decade (270 to Win “California”). The dominance of the 
Democratic Party in California certainly helps to explain why no voter identification law has 
made it through the state legislature, because Democrats tend to get their support from African 
Americans and Latinos. Another measure showing the power of liberal politics in California is 
the lack of support for ALEC within the California legislature. In fact, only three state 
legislatures out of both houses have any ties with ALEC, showing how few California politicians 
want to associate with ALEC and its anti-immigrant agenda (SourceWatch “California”). As 
noted earlier, Latinos and African-Americans are more likely to lack the proper forms of 
identification, so passing a voter identification law would only hurt the dominance of the 
Democratic Party in California by making voting more difficult for these important 
demographics. California offers an interesting point of comparison with Republican states that 
passed voter identification laws. For example, during the 2010 midterm elections, 43 percent of 
the African American population of California voted, while 35 percent of the Hispanic 
population voted (Voting Hot Report “California”). These changes represented a 5 percent 
increase in the former and a 2 percent decrease in the latter. In comparison, Florida’s black 
population voted at a rate of 41 percent, whereas Latinos voted at a rate of 42 percent (Voting 
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Hot Report “California”). The rate of voting for citizens ages 18-29 was also higher in California 
at 28 percent, which also represented a 3 percent increase. These changes occurred at a time in 
which the voting participation of overall population of California held steady at around 47 
percent. Therefore, the growing strength of minority and young voters in California is apparent 
as the rate of Latinos and young people increased during a time period in which the overall 
population did not increase its electoral participation. 
In a Democrat controlled state, the rate of voting for people of color and young people 
has been enough to prevent the passage of a voter identification law in California. Despite the 
fact that the voting rate of Latinos in California appears lower than that of states where the 
Republican Party has passed voter identification laws, in a blue state, this level of political 
participation is enough to curb Republican Party efforts. In one article for the Sacramento Bee, 
David Siders comments on how many state elections in recent years have gone against 
Republicans because of foolish campaign priorities that have offended Latino voters. Even in 
cases in which Republicans did venture to attempt to get a voter identification bill through the 
California legislature, they have met with little success. From the year 2000 until 2005, 
Republicans introduced voter identification bills in the California legislature 8 times, only to 
have it fail each time.  
 The recent struggles faced by Republican Tea Party groups in their efforts to push for a 
voter identification law in California in recent years greatly reflect the demographic changes and 
Democratic dominance of the state. For example, one article covering the push characterizes the 
prospect of getting the bill passed through the legislature as a “long shot” (Roth). The 
Republican Party of California even seemed reluctant to propose such legislation. For example, 
after his election as party chair, Jim Brulte suggested that Republicans should push other items 
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on their agenda in order to avoid alienating potential Latino supporters (Siders). He also noted 
that his opinion stems partially from the lack of potential for success in such a heavily 
Democratic state. Even the Tea Party Caucus in California expressed reservations about pushing 
a voter identification law, only pushing for a bill that did not require identification presented by 
voters to include photos (Roth). Excluding this provision makes the bill less strict according to 
the standards of the National Conference of State Legislatures. Some Tea Party authorities have 
admitted that they are fighting for legislation that is not likely to succeed in California. Steve 
Brandau, a Tea Party organizer pushing for a voter identification law, acknowledged that he did 
not expect much success for his bill because California is “a very liberal state” (Siders). Other 
Republicans have attempted to discourage conservatives for pushing for voter identification 
laws. In 2014, the Republican candidate for Secretary of State, Pete Peterson even went so far as 
to say that it would be “wrong” for Republicans “to go crazy on this issue” (Friedman). This lack 
of support from mainstream Republicans has led the Tea Party to attempt to pass a voter 
identification law through the use of voter referendum (Roth). Therefore, the case of California 
clearly exemplifies the importance of interplay between state racial demographics and party 
politics in the passage of voter identification laws. 
 In addition to preventing the passage of voter identification laws, the Democratic 
majority in the California state legislature has successfully passed laws targeted to make voting 
simpler for young people. For example, the California legislature passed a bill allowing 16 year 
olds to pre-register to vote in elections (Brennan Center “Voter Expansion”). The bill passed 
through the legislature despite concerns from Republicans that it would make voting inefficient 
(Sacramento Bee “Pre-registration”). The Democrat sponsor Hannah-Beth Jackson specifically 
noted the law’s purpose to encourage the registration of young people. In addition, the California 
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legislature passed a bill to allow for the government to assist individuals in juvenile detention 
centers who are of age to receive assistance in registering to vote. Once again, we see that the 
California Democratic majority has attempted to allow for more young people to vote, whereas 
in North Carolina, Republican legislators insisted on including provisions in their voter 
identification bill that would prevent young people from voting. 
Figure 3 
 
State  North 
Carolin
a 
Florida Wyoming Oklahoma Californ
ia 
Voter Identification Law 
Strictness 
Strict Non-Strict No-Law Not-Strict No-Law 
% of overall population 
voting at passage 
45.4 43.9 47.2 40.4 47.1 
% change of overall 
population voting 
5.1 -0.3 -3.9 5.8 -0.5 
%of African-Americans 
voting in state elections at 
passage 
41 42 37 37 43 
% change in African-
Americans voting in state 
elections 
9 3 12 12 5 
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% of Hispanic voters voting 
in state elections at passage 
28 41 24 16 37 
% change in Hispanic voters 
in state elections at passage 
-2 10 -9 -9 -2 
% of people 18-29 who 
voted in state elections at 
passage 
35 24 24 19 28 
% change in people 18-29 
who voted in state elections 
at passage 
5 6 -2 -6 3 
Party in Control Republi
can 
Republica
n 
Republican Republican Democr
atic 
Did debates revolve around 
race or involve racist 
justification? 
Yes Yes No No No 
Did proponents show intent 
to hurt young people? 
Yes No No No No 
Did anti-immigrant lobby 
groups impact passage? 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Did the bill package involve 
immigration? 
Yes Yes No No No 
Number of ALEC influence 
legislators 
32 32 26 35 3 
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ALEC bill language? Yes No No No No 
Special circumstances  Strict anti-
felon 
voting law 
Strictest-anti-
felon law in the 
country, strict 
id law, no voter 
drives allowed 
High Native-
American 
Population 
 
 
Conclusions 
 Overall, my case studies did show that racial demographics played a significant role in 
the passage of voter identification laws and the stringency of those laws but that age 
demographics did not play a significant role. This satisfied the first of my sub-hypotheses. The 
states that I examined in which there was a significant increase in the rate of African American 
voting saw the passage of voter identification laws. The racial changes in these states were 
directly related to the passage of the voter identification laws based on my observations of the 
process of the passage of these pieces of legislation. The states in which voter identification laws 
passed saw debates concerning the bill focusing on racially charged issues such as the prospect 
of undocumented immigrants voting. The case of the racially tinged commentary about “lazy 
blacks” losing out because of the voting law change in North Carolina and the revelations of 
racist intentions in Florida coming from Jim Greer and Charles Crist stand out as examples. In 
addition, I found that the influence of anti-immigration groups and “voter integrity” groups such 
as ALEC and True the Vote in Florida and North Carolina also indicate intentions of attempting 
to suppress minority voting. In North Carolina, the Voter Integrity Project directly provided 
information to politicians voting on the voter identification law bill. Both North Carolina and 
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Florida’s voter identification law bills received support from a state legislature brimming with 
representatives with ties to ALEC. Also, the passage of these voter identification laws in bill 
“packages” with direct references to the aim of preventing illegal immigrants voting shows the 
racial intentions of the Republicans in these instances. In contrast, the aim of preventing young 
people from voting in elections did not present itself in many of the states I studied. Only in 
North Carolina, where legislators singled out student identification cards as unacceptable forms 
of voter identification, did Republicans appear dead set on driving down the vote of young 
people. In no other state did the Republican Party provide any credible indication of this being an 
aim of the voter identification laws that passed. 
 In contrast with the states in which voter identification laws passed, the Republican states 
in which no voter identification law passed or a voter access expansion bill passed did not face 
any demographic changes that would potentially hurt the Republican Party’s election prospects. 
For example, in Wyoming and Oklahoma, only 24 and 16 percent of the respective Latino 
population voted, whereas in Florida the rate was 41 percent. In addition, the rate of Latinos 
voting in elections was actually on the decline in Oklahoma and Wyoming. The rate of African-
American voting was also lower in Wyoming and Oklahoma, at 37 percent compared to the rate 
of 41 and 42 percent in North Carolina and Florida respectively. The lack of voter identification 
laws in these states matches my hypothesis because their rates of voter participation their 
minority communities were lower than in Florida and North Carolina. However, the legislatures 
of both Oklahoma and Wyoming reflected the influence of anti-immigrant groups. For example, 
in the Wyoming legislature, 26 legislators had ties to ALEC, while in the Oklahoma legislature, 
35 legislators did. Despite the presence of this influence, which would conceivably lead both 
legislators to pass voter identification laws, other factors may have led the legislatures of these 
D’Alessio 43 
 
states to fail to pass voter identification laws. Wyoming currently boasts one of the strictest anti-
felon laws in the country, something which effectively disenfranchises many racial minorities. 
Oklahoma had already passed a voter identification law, and is seeing a steep growth in its 
Native American population, a group that the Republican Party has sought to win over in recent 
years. Therefore, my analysis of Republican controlled states that did not pass a voter 
identification law still upholds my hypothesis about the importance of racial demographic 
changes to the passage of voter identification laws.  
 Finally, my analysis of California, a Democratic controlled state, also upholds my 
argument that the Republican Party’s reaction to this state shows that my hypothesis about the 
specifically Republican reaction to racial demographic changes has led to the creation of voter 
identification laws. For example, the Democratic Party has reacted to spikes in the Latino and 
black voting rates in California by passing laws which make voting simpler for people, rather 
than more complicated. In addition, the Republican Party’s response has become more muted 
because of the necessity of trying to win over more Latino and black voters in a heavily 
Democratic state. Attempts to pass voter identification laws in the state have failed repeatedly. 
Only the far right leaning Tea Party groups have remained steadfast in their position on passing 
voter identification laws in the state of California.  
 While I was able to conclude that the growing proportion of voting participation in 
people of color contributed to the Republican passage of voter identification laws, I was not able 
to refute my null hypothesis because the growing proportion of young people did not influence 
the passage of voter identification laws as well. Only in North Carolina did I discover any 
evidence of this concern factoring into the Republican efforts to pass the bill. In all of the other 
states that I looked at, I found no evidence of an intention of disenfranchising young people 
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behind the passage of a voter identification law. No public officials spoke of this, and any laws 
that I studied in connection with these states had any language that advantaged or disadvantaged 
young people. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 Further research on this topic could use data on demographics that could break down 
minorities further. For example, it could look at Latinos of a certain age as opposed to lumping 
all Latinos together. In addition, Latinos come from many different areas within Latin America 
and have historically favored a wide range of different political positions. For instance, Latinos 
from Cuba have traditionally held more conservative positions than Latinos from Mexico 
(Foxnews Latino). In a state like Florida, which has a lot of Cuban immigrants, it would be 
interesting to study ways in which the Republican Party balances its desires to prevent 
undocumented immigrants from voting while also trying to not offend its supporters in the 
Cuban-American community. 
 Studying the impact of young people’s political clout as an isolated group on the passage 
of voter identification laws has proven to be somewhat of a dead end. Very rarely did any elected 
officials display any intention of accounting for changes in the average age of the state in coming 
to their decision to support voter identification laws. Looking at the overlap between people of 
color and changing age averages would prove more fruitful overall. For instance, it may prove 
useful to look at whether there are more stringent voter identification laws in states where the 
Latino population is younger as opposed to older, because it could be assumed that young 
Latinos are more liberal than older ones. 
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 In addition, the impact of the Native American population on the passage of voter 
identification laws needs further study. Native Americans make up a substantial portion of the 
population in many states in the West and Southwest. However, as I have noted earlier, their 
political beliefs tend to lean to the right in spite of the fact that they have often voted for 
Democratic candidates. My study did not initially account for Native Americans as people of 
color, and future studies should be sure to do so. Perhaps a more in depth study of mid-western 
states, where Native Americans tend to live in greater numbers, and the impact of this political 
group on voter identification laws, could spread more light on the subject. 
 Future studies should account for other means that state legislatures have for reducing 
access to the ballot besides voter identification laws. My study revealed that several states which 
do not have voter identification laws, such as Wyoming, still have strict anti-felon voting laws 
which help to disenfranchise many people of color. In addition, I found that the passage of voter 
identification laws in states tended to come as a part of a massive overhaul of the voting system 
that includes measures to empower anti-voter fraud vigilante groups. I found that these kinds of 
complimentary measures that accompany voter identification laws revealed a lot more about the 
intent of the voter identification laws than the bill itself. A larger scale analysis and comparison 
of the states in which legislatures passed massive bill packages and what factors led that to 
happen could prove fruitful in explaining more about the true causes behind the voter 
identification law controversy. 
` Finally, the study of the impact of ALEC on the voter identification law controversy 
would also help elucidate the causes behind the most recent voter identification law craze. ALEC 
has ties across many state legislatures and the allegations that ALEC directly impacts the 
language within voter identification laws was true in the case of North Carolina. While some past 
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studies have examined the role of ALEC on the passage of voter identification laws, the 
significance of this relationship, as determined by my study, would warrant further inspection. 
Of particular interest would be a large scale correlation test between the level of involvement 
with ALEC and sponsorship and support for voter identification laws. 
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